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Interest in the entrepreneurial role of public administrators has a long history.
1 It is linked recently to the popular government reinvention literature about how change and innovation enter public organizations (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) . Entrepreneurs are known for their skill as innovators, for their keen understanding of the dynamics of organizational change, and for their creativity in advocating solutions to policy problems (Brower and Abolafia 1996; Kingdon 1984; Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom 1995) . In this article, we focus on the role that entrepreneurs play in the process of institutional change. This focus on institutions (i.e., routines), practices, and procedures, while increasingly used among organizational theorists, has been less frequently applied in public administration.
2 It shifts attention from policy to practice.
Schumpeter (1991) defines entrepreneurial behavior as the doing of new things or old things in new ways. He identifies such
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behavior as the engine that drives organizational change (Shane and Venkataraman 2000, 219) . Actors who advance change by reinterpreting basic routines may be thought of as "institutional entrepreneurs" (DiMaggio 1988, 14; Zucker 1991) . Like the more traditional business entrepreneurs, institutional entrepreneurs take initiatives and risks for a perceived payoff, but they do so in the context of existing organizational structures. Such actors envision alternative means of getting things done in organizations (Beckert 1997; Brower and Abolafia 1996) . Using their exceptional social skills, these actors change institutions by influencing colleagues to accept a novel view of a situation (Fligstein 1997; DiMaggio 1988, 14-15) . Entrepreneurs have in common their detaching of themselves from their contexts, and when an opportunity is present they are able to envision novel routines, practices, or procedures for solving problems (Huff, Huff, and Barr 2000; Beckert 1997 ). Institutions, embedded in context, provide a rich medium for studying both entrepreneurial behavior and organizational change.
While entrepreneurs are considered to be change agents in both political science and organization theory, their literatures fail to illustrate how entrepreneurial potential is realized (Zucker 1988; Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom 1995, 74) . Specifically, these literatures do not adequately address the conditions under which actors assume the entrepreneur's role and the cognitive processes by which they interpret those conditions as occasions for change.
In this article we will address these gaps by using the theory of sense making to explore how entrepreneurial action generates institutional change (Weick 1979 and Gioia and Thomas 1996; Starbuck and Milliken 1988) . In organizations, sense making consists of cognitive strategies for interpreting reality. In the sensein organization theory, institutions may making perspective, actors normally enact the ordinary routines of be defined as a framework of routines, . . . .." . , . _ . , rules, roles, practices, and procedures that organizational life most of the time. On occasion, they become shapes how actors make sense of problems aware of substantive interruptions in established organizational in organizations (Scott 1995) . Over time, arrangements. For example, these can be in the form of new inforSeZifiu^lTJrvSo.s, ™ tion > new tech "°'°gy. shift * in governmental policies, changes in are repeatedly selected by actors (Berger the activity of stakeholders, or changes in funding. Some actors and Luckmann 1966) . Eventually, institu-respond to these extraordinary interruptions in their routines as tions come to be understood by actors as fundamenta) shifts in their environments. These cues may lead them organizational reality, or the way things J get done" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, to think strategically about whether and how to alter current 59; Scott 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1991;  awareness that things were ever different behavior, some actors devise strategies to advance their mterpretain the past and begin to take the institution (Fligstein 1997) . tionalized arrangements for granted. They become unable to conceive of other ways ... . . . , , . of doing things (Berger and Luckmann We Wl11 examine how entrepreneurs used these sense-making 1966 ; Jepperson 1991) .
strategies to effect change in institutional routines, and we will examine the organizational environment in order to understand the factors that shaped entrepreneurial actors' interpretations of events. We will then discuss the entrepreneurial actors' use of three sensemaking strategies to respond to pressure to change. These strategies will be elaborated using metaphors from music composition to help convey this complex process.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THREE ASSUMPTIONS
Our analysis of the data, combined with a reading of institutional change literature (Scott 1987; Zucker 1988 and Meyer and Rowan 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991) , suggests that institutional change in organizations rests on three assumptions. First, organizational actors make sense of, or interpret, their organizations and environmental contexts. They do this in order to simplify the world they live in (Fligstein 1991, 315) , reducing uncertainty and increasing stability. They interpret the world by seeking out information about events and then assessing the effect of those events on their organizational positions, interests, and capacities. They enact change according to that interpretation.
Second, environmental pressures change in sometimes unpredictable and unexpected ways, and actors are affected by these shifts. Environmental shifts can originate in society, ideology, or politics and can be sudden or incremental. They can include greater or lesser emphasis on certain policies, more or less coordination among constituency groups, resource losses or gains, regulatory changes, or technology advances (Powell 1988; Zucker 1988) . As a result, once-expansive organizational budgets can become austere, nominal regulations can become intrusive, constituents can change from apathy to involvement, and computer systems can become outdated. When these environmental pressures shift, they can make obsolete or can enhance the capacity of actors to take action, increase or decrease the opportunities available to actors to pursue their own interests, and alter the level of support entrepreneurs need to generate in order to advance institutional change. In a fundamental way, environmental shifts affect the information actors will notice or seek out in order to make sense of change events. How actors frame events shapes how actors will enact change. Third, the degree to which actors take their context for granted varies with environmental pressure. Complex and shifting environments with multiple pressure points for change can disrupt or even sever actors' attachment to old institutionalized practices. Reductions in fiscal resources, for example, can threaten the programs that organizations administer or can signal the need for redesign. Regulatory changes that are ignored invite sanctions. As 527/J-PART, October 2002 environmental pressure increases, both external critics and internal organization members may question institutionalized routines, exposing taken-for-granted rules. As taken-for-granted routines are questioned, power and resource distribution assumptions are weakened, not just in one area, but also contagiously in other related organizational arenas (Zucker 1988) . As arrangements are challenged, the potential for institutional change increases. In less pressured and simpler environmental contexts, with perhaps fewer constituents and less resource volatility, actors may be less scrutinized and therefore better able to maintain former practices.
MUSIC THEMES AS METAPHORS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
In addition to these assumptions, we will illustrate our analysis of the data by using metaphors from the field of music. We will use three music themes to capture the pace and sensibility of how institutions change over time. More importantly, we find that the music metaphors illuminate how creative interpretation and systemic constraint combine in the process of change. The three musical themes we will use to explore that process are keying, improvisation, and reprise.
Keying: Transposing a Theme
The first theme conceptualizes institutional change as keying. The term is borrowed from Goffman (1986) and is used to explain a process of interpretation that actors employ to solve problems. We apply the concept in the same manner, but we link it more directly than does Goffman with its musical connotation. In music, different keys may be used to transpose musical notation to fit voices or instruments without altering the basic melody or sense of a piece. While the music is essentially unchanged, performers' interpretations exhibit subtle differences.
Exhibit 1 Metaphors for Institutional Change
Keying:
Pursuing change practices that leave Transposing a theme arrangements essentially unchanged Improvisation: Using creativity, intuition, and Ingenious adaptation flexibility to fundamentally change a relatively structured situation Keying involves the systematic transformation of an activity into something either closely or loosely patterned on that activity but seen by participants as significantly different (Goffman 1974) . In keying, while organizational institutionalized practices remain essentially unchanged, actors see them as different from prior arrangements. The introduction of an automated system, for example, is sometimes a keyed change, where computer produced spreadsheets substitute for manually produced calculations while underlying program rules and practices remain unchanged (Wilson 1989) . Keying recasts unchanged institutionalized processes into new molds. Nevertheless, it is the same old song in a different key. The rules, routines, or procedures are only slightly altered.
Improvisation: Ingenious Adaptation
The second theme reflects recent literature that has suggested the use of jazz improvisation as a metaphor to understand organizational change (Weick 1998) . The layperson's frequent misperception of jazz improvisation is that it involves an unstructured, extemporaneous music session in which musicians play anything they like (Barrett and Peplowski 1998) . This is contrasted with jazz musicians' explanations that although successful improvisations are original they are firmly embedded in a musical context, rich in rules and routines (Barrett and Peplowski 1998) . In Berliner's ethnography of jazz musicians (1994) , he explains how jazz improvisations must reflect the complex rules of music notation, the traditions and structures of chord and tonal relations, and the melody that is itself embedded in songs. According to Berliner (p. 241) , "Improvisation involves reworking pre-composed material and designs in relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special condition of performance, thereby adding unique features to every creation." Thus, improvisation reflects a tension between existing routines and ingenious adaptation to new contexts. It requires that the player/actor bring creativity, intuition, and flexibility to a relatively structured situation. The result, when successful, is a fresh interpretation.
In the context of institutional change, improvisation refers to a process that reflects this same tension between existing routines and ingenious adaptation. Improvisation occurs when organizational actors face unusual problems that do not respond to routine solutions or slight variations. Under those conditions, actors listen to others, contest others' interpretation of events, and sometimes agree to follow each other down a different path. This leads to fresh and unexpected solutions to problems.
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Reprise: Replaying Earlier Themes
A third theme presents change as reprise. A reprise in music indicates the repetition of an earlier theme following an improvisation, as in jazz, or the replaying and embellishment of a phrase, as in concertos. In music, the reprise resolves the fragmentation of melody in improvisation or among movements, and it serves to make coherent what was heard by reminding listeners again of the underlying melody. Reprise advances the musical story.
Following periods of significant change, organizations restabilize and internalize improvised routines to reassert their former order (Abolafia and Kilduff 1988; Huff, Huff, and Barr 2000; Purser 1997) . In organizations, a reprise is a way to lend coherence to transitioning or altered circumstances (Weick 1998) . In public organizations, for example, legal mandates frequently are vague but urgent directives for government agencies to act (Wilson 1989) . Organizations that take improvised action in an attempt to accommodate to this pressure may disrupt routines and introduce new practices. This may happen before the organization assesses the full impact of these changes on the rest of the operation. Once changes are implemented, actors must attend to the disorder that improvisations may have triggered. Typically, during the process organizations modify changes to accommodate political sensitivities that are related to the changes, issue amendments to regulations, and revise internal procedures. As in music, reprise is an attempt to restore harmony among the organization's competing interests and to reassure its internal and external constituencies of its continued stability and legitimacy.
In organizations, as in musical performances, actors who are keying, improvising, or reprising change are guided in their actions by context and by local conditions (Granovetter 1985) . The sequence of change in organizations is not necessarily linear or predetermined. Organizational actors may improvise change before they key change, or they may decide to refrain from change as a response to problems. Actors, overcome by the pressure to change, can decide to leave unaltered their current arrangements (Huff, Huff, and Barr 2000) . The logic that actors apply under pressure to change is linked to their understanding of what local and environmental situations, politics, resources, and constituents require of them (Granovetter 1985) .
THE STUDY
This study was prompted by institutional theory literature that suggested more research was needed to explain the process of institutional change (Zucker 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991) . Additionally, we sought to address parallel concerns in public administration literature about how institutionalized routines, practices, and procedures change in bureaucracies (Wilson 1989; Barzelay 1992) and undertook the study to ask about the process of institutional change and how actors figure in that process. To understand that process we attempted to explore how actors developed strategies to deal with pressure to change routinized aspects of their work. At the same time we were interested in understanding, within the dynamics of the process, how organizational context and environmental pressure affected actors' strategizing. Finally, we were curious about how actors performed these strategies, and to what effect, and were looking for organizational examples of actors struggling with environmental pressure for institutional change.
In order to explore these questions we chose a large state agency that had experienced fundamental change in its practices and policies. Information for the study was derived from first-hand observations, interviews with agency members, and content analysis of organizational documents. We began the study with two years of participant observations in the design and construction unit of a state Department of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) by the first author. Those observations contributed to a deep familiarity with the organizational culture and with the routines, practices, and social networks of actors across the agency.
At the end of this period, thirteen informants from different organizational units were interviewed in-depth, using an interview protocol designed to elicit their experiences of change in the organization. Situated in the DDD's central office, the design and construction unit (CDC) was organizationally located within one of two major agency divisions, the administrative division. The CDC staff included licensed architects and engineers who considered themselves to be the agency's building construction authorities. CDC construction staff who were interviewed were two unit architects, an engineer, a cost estimator, a construction field inspector, an interior designer, and a construction manager. The CDC capital budget analyst and the unit's administrative assistant, who together monitored capital spending on agency projects, were also interviewed. The agency's division for program consisted of many specialty units located both in the central office and in the much larger campus centers across the state. Program units were collectively responsible for programming the twenty-four-hour treatment of the disabled. They considered themselves to be the agency's front-line staff, involved in its most essential function, that of direct care. Nevertheless, they felt undervalued by the CDC, with whom they clashed frequently over construction and budget matters. From
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Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs/tip and Institutional Change the program division we interviewed a central office manager, two field managers, and a former campus business officer. Each of the thirteen informants had worked at the DDD for over fifteen years and many had been with the agency since before the initial move out of state campuses into the community. Most of the same individuals were observed during the participant observation period.
The interview protocol was developed after a two-year period of on-site observations. Coding and analysis of the data that were collected followed the grounded theory methods suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990, 23) , and we attempted to develop sufficient detail to illustrate the change process in some depth. We transcribed interviews verbatim and coded them into broad categories. Applying the Strauss and Corbin method, we analyzed the categories in-depth in an attempt to discover patterns of behavior and relationships among those patterns.
Despite this immersion in the data, we were concerned that over a multiyear period our informants' memories of events might fade (Weick 1995; Starbuck and Milliken 1988) . We used several techniques to create an authentic and credible account of events (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000) . First, we used semistructured interview protocols that encouraged informants to elaborate accounts of change episodes in as risk free an atmosphere as possible. Second, we selected some informants who, while situated in different units of the organization during parallel time periods, provided comparable accounts of the same events. Others, now working within the same units, identified with different professions and related similar organizational events from different perspectives. Third, a content analysis of the unit's history files documented, confirmed, and complemented the interviews. Finally, the first author's participant observations of the organization and her familiarity with the organization's history, staff, and culture were another set of filters on the data.
By analyzing the data in this way, patterns emerged that we found could be framed using the three music metaphors: keying, improvising, and reprise. Our use of metaphors proceeds from a social construction perspective (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Smith and Turner 1995) . In accordance with this view, our metaphors are used to suggest new ways to think about the data rather than to claim a one-to-one relationship between music composition and institutional change. Thus our early analysis suggested an understanding of change as similar to music composition. We later found that music performance better captured the different sense-making strategies our informants used.
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Within each of these music themes, we specify three elements: we identify the context that elicits the change behavior; we explain the interpretive procedures employed by the actors to make sense of that context; and we define the techniques used by participants to enact the change.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THREE THEMES First Theme: Keying the Community to the Campus
For decades the state agency had provided custodial residential care to mentally retarded persons. A former agency business officer bleakly recalls that in the early 1970s "[i]t was a warehouse." It was that image of the agency that a television reporter exposed to the public in the mid-1970s. He broadcast secretly filmed, neglected residents on national television. This immediately put pressure on the state, and the pressure did not ease until state officials had signed a court-ordered consent decree to change the treatment of the disabled. Responsibility for implementing the decree fell to the Department for Developmental Disabilities (DDD).
Central to the consent decree was the idea that disabled persons should not live in large, impersonal campuses as they had for the last hundred years, but in normal settings. This "normalization" involved living in a community, although there was little agreement on what that meant (Castellani 1987) .
Context: One Hundred Years of Campuses.
The idea that state institutions were inhumane contradicted front-line staffs view of themselves as good caretakers of a difficult population. The consent decree was an insufficient event to change their view that the hundred-year-old tradition of campus living was good for many individuals. They also worried that the move to the community would eliminate jobs. As one field manager explained, front-line staff were "invested in the work they did. They did not think that because they were part of the campus they were part of the problem. The staff had a high regard for the people they cared for. They cared so much about them . .. they didn't want to let them go. They felt it was too big a change for them. The staff loved them. And the staff was worried about job security."
As the agency took action in response to the consent decree, its early attempts at community home construction from the late 1970s until the early 1980s took longer to complete than executive staff had anticipated or could tolerate politically. To solve that problem, executive staff directed the central office design and construction unit (CDC) to find a way to speed up construction.
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Sense Making: Keeping the Disabled Safe and Secure. The CDC administrative assistant contrasted her sense of the stability of the campuses with the urgency and rationale that surrounded community homes: "When I first came here everything was institutionalized. That was the way things were going. Then we had the incident and then ... they shifted to community.... It happened quite quickly ... the commissioner went down to the city and saw the conditions. And right away the commission was set up and quickly, within months, it was decided, it hit the papers and it made everyone look bad. It made the governor look bad, and we had to start building houses. They wanted the people out of the institutions and they wanted houses built."
The pressure to respond to the incident, intense media attention, was eventually passed on to the CDC unit by executive staff. The CDC staff had been the maintainers of the campuses and it was in keeping with past practices that they were chosen to deal with the problem of community homes. They wielded their professional credentials to ensure that agency construction was according to their interpretations of fire and building codes. All permission to advance construction projects passed through multiple CDC reviews. The unit's authority over designs, permits, and occupancy allowed CDC control over the agency's vast system of campus residences and nullified non-CDC staff attempts to influence construction projects.
The CDC unit proudly likened the campuses, over which they stood professional guard, to small towns, because with their extensive structural and mechanical systems, independent power plants, laundries, kitchens, and cafeterias the campuses were completely self-sufficient. The notion of a small town also reflected the many safeguards the CDC insisted were necessary on the campuses to ensure the safety and security of residents.
CDC staff often invoked the idea of safety and security to defend their actions and recommendations. This motto, they believed, defined their jobs as making sure that the disruption of ordinary as well as extraordinary events (such as power failures, snowstorms, or fuel shortages) would be minimized for campus dwellers and workers. The essence of campus construction, and the identity of the CDC, was reflected in detailed attention to safety and security for the developmentally disabled who lived there. The CDC believed that community homes could be decorated to look more "humanized," as the consent decree demanded, but structurally they were to reflect the construction routines, practices, and procedures of the campuses.
In keying the community homes on the campuses in this manner, CDC actors used the sense-making strategy of "bracketing" (Weick 1995, 35) . Bracketing involves carving out the elements of a new phenomenon from the components of the existing context. It is a cognitive operation that actors use to put together a new action logic. Actors use bracketing to fit new events and processes into the routines of everyday life. It is a way for actors to order problems so that they have a sense of what happens next. In this case, the CDC categorized the community home as a version of the campuses. Bracketing is illustrated by a CDC architect's recollections of a construction kick-off field meeting with campus staff, where one of the first models was under discussion: "It seemed like a mini institution. It did then and it does now. They replicated what they knew. They didn't know . . . that there could be something else. And their baggage, their experience was that of an institution. 'Yes, let's not put them in wards with no privacy, let's give them the amenities of a home. Double rooms possibly and a nice living room possibly and things like that.' But the fit and finishes, I'm speaking as an architect now, were very institutional."
Using the bracketed concepts from the campuses, CDC actors framed the community home problem as one of how to produce homes quickly. They based this on managerial directives, their own experiences of delays in earlier construction, and their understanding of the consent decree. The CDC bracketed the routines and practices that had addressed this problem in the past into a prototype model community home.
The CDC believed that the models were different from campus residences. As the CDC administrative assistant recalled, the architects "built the houses like they were instructed to do ... but they did it with care. They did it with responsibility ... they wanted to make sure that the houses they built were exactly built for the people that were going to go in them." Despite these intentions the model homes did not reflect the aesthetics of ordinary homes. The model rendition of community homes resembled barns, an interior designer recalled, and housed twelve residents at a time, exactly the number housed in campus wards. The CDC built campus-level safety and security into the community homes. With their large size, redundant systems, double living rooms, and commercial-type laundries, the models were mini institutions.
Techniques for Keying Change. In the musical context, transposers use techniques to change keys, so they can refer to them in subsequent renditions. In the organizational context, key change actors also use techniques to transform and sustain existing arrangements into new ones. The techniques the CDC used were composed of the institutionalized routines they had used in campus construction. The techniques included controlling maneuvers to block new or different construction practices. These were the enforced applications of the architectural and engineering specification manuals and the detailed review of design and construction plans based on the manuals.
Technique #1: Model home manuals. The CDC unit captured their ideas for a model community residence in two volumes of technical detail that specified the dimensions and the design of the models. These extensive technical manuals were the primary vehicles through which the CDC's ideas of community home were communicated throughout the DDD and to consultants. These "cookbooks," as CDC staff labeled them, symbolized the authority of the CDC group to control community home construction. They bore the imprimaturs of executive staff in endorsing introductions. They were unequivocal in their specification of what a community home must incorporate. For example, they specified that the homes were to have fire sprinklers installed in "all habitable areas," including closets. Additionally, they listed the requirements for the models: two means of egress on each sleeping level; two dining rooms; two screened-in porches; two living rooms; two showers; three toilets; three lavatories; a therapeutic oversized Jacuzzi-style tub; an ordinary bathtub; a large pantry; two activity rooms; and so on.
Technique #2: Construction plan reviews. The keying of the campus into model community homes was reinforced by the CDC unit every time it reviewed plans to construct new homes or advised executive staff that a non-CDC staff person had suggested a deviation from the models. Since all design and construction plans had to be reviewed by CDC staff, they had many opportunities to measure and compare the details of the plans to the details of the model manuals and to their own mental images of design. If something slipped by their desk review, their frequent presence at field staff meetings and their ongoing reviews of construction projects underway provided them with many other opportunities to control details. "We have put them on a short leash," scribbled one architect on a memo from field staff proposing to modify the model design on advice from local academics. CDC staff reacted with their usual tactic of listing each novel proposed item along with their estimate of the increased cost for the item over the model specification for the same detail. This tally unequivocally showed that the deviations from the model design would be too costly, thus making their rejection a logical conclusion. In a typical review memo to a similarly creative consultant architect, CDC staff instructed him to "rationalize" his design to conform to the model, suggesting sarcastically that perhaps he did not understand the purpose of a schematic design.
536/J-PART, October 2002
During this period, acting like institutional entrepreneurs shoring up their dominance within the organization (Fligstein 1997) , the CDC applied these controls to anyone involved with the models within the organization.
Second Theme: Improvising Construction Routines
The DDD constructed about two hundred model homes during the 1980s. As advocates for the disabled heard about the details of the homes and experienced them, they increasingly criticized the DDD for promoting the models to the exclusion of other types of homes. Organizational leadership-feeling pressure from fiscal reductions-declared a moratorium on new construction around 1989.
Context: New Players, New Tune. Improvisation begins with decomposition of the taken-for-granted understanding that frames the setting. Jazz musicians talk about improvisation as playing on the edge (Barrett 1998, 606) . By this they mean playing in such a way that the resolution of the notes they begin to play may be unknown to them even as they produce them. Similarly, in this organization, actors, although grounded in experience and ideology, ventured to the edge of their context and beyond to find a new way to create community homes (Goffman 1974) . In the first theme, we saw how organizational actors interpreted community homes using familiar techniques. This resulted in the interpretation of community homes as campus-like wards. In improvisation, that interpretation was challenged by new participants-new players internal and external to the organization-who questioned the fit between community living and the community home models. These new entrepreneurs criticized the superficiality of the key change that created the model community homes. Speaking to different aspects of the models, this diverse group of voices challenged keyers' bracketing of the community home problem.
Neighbors were the first to notice the mini institutions. As neighbors experienced life next door to model homes, they began to compare them to their own homes. Their conclusions were that the model homes were too big, too expensive, attracted too much traffic, and did not fit the neighborhood. In some areas, neighbors of prospective community homes, having been surprised by the installation of model homes, protested. Others succeeded in securing legislation that provided for a community review and hearing process at which they could voice concerns.
Legislative overseers were alarmed by the public's complaints. They questioned the models in a letter to the agency: "The committee is concerned over the apparent de facto policy by the DDD of developing community residential facilities, especially of the twelve-bed prototype models. Do twelve bed and larger residences afford the opportunity for quality of life and community integration?" The rhetorical nature of the question suggested that the answer was no.
DDD field staff, although concerned with program services, was usually on the organizational fringes. Unexpectedly, a statewide training session of community field staff provided them a forum to express their concerns. A report following up on that meeting cited those concerns: "Staff, during the 1986 site development training sessions ... indicated that community opposition was increasingly becoming an impediment to the future development of twelve-bed sites because of their large size and inability to fit in with the other homes in the neighborhood." Concerned about these criticisms, agency management ordered a survey of the models throughout the state.
The survey findings indicated that the model community homes that the DDD had been building for several years "resembled small medical buildings, others looked like motels, and, in a few cases, funeral homes. Large parking facilities in front of homes gave the homes a commercial appearance. The presence of dumpsters and bright red fire bells gave the residences an institutional appearance. The interiors were also institutional, with bright, lighted exit signs placed over every exit door in the house and at the end of the hallways. Floor finishes were office-like and bathrooms resembled [those in a] hospital or nursing homes." The report concluded, "The need for prototypes [models] should be questioned. Buildings should be site and neighborhood adaptive and, therefore, individuality in design should be considered."
At the same time that these questions were raised, developmental disabilities advocacy groups, active in state and national associations, were redefining the image of the individuals they represented. Increasingly, these advocates resented the dominance of state rules and regulations over government-funded treatment of the disabled, including their family members. They joined a nationwide movement of other advocate groups toward individualization for the developmental^ disabled. They wanted government to see them and the persons they represented as individuals who were entitled to make demands about where they lived and what their homes should resemble. The disabled individuals, they argued, varied just as much as the rest of the population in lifestyle and preferences. They wanted this uniqueness recognized. Model homes were inconsistent with that view of the developmentally disabled.
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Sense Making: Noticing the Scene Changing. DDD actors noted these inconsistencies. Meaningful noticing is awareness by actors of gaps between what they intended to do and what resulted (Weick 1995, 121) . In enacting the models, organizational actors had produced a version of community life that others could react against. Both the organizational actors and the external stakeholders found the model homes to be incongruent with their ideas of community living.
The questions raised by the new players, articulated at the advocate and staff levels, contributed to organizational actors' unease with the models as community homes. These actors began to question the practices that had community homes keyed to campus wards. Within the agency, program staff, responsible for treatment programs, challenged the CDC's authority over construction. They insisted that the construction and design of community homes was within the authority of program staff that best knew the needs of prospective residents of the community homes. Furthermore, they argued, one did not need an architectural license to see that the models were not normal community homes.
The rigorous imposition of the model standards had the perverse effect of highlighting the existence of other ways of designing homes (Zucker 1991, 86) . As a result, actors moved away from the routines and practices that held the models in place, just as musical improvisers move away from formal arrangements with no specific pattern in mind.
Additionally, actors noticed that there was no formula for resolving the dilemma. One field manager recalls, "I remember it was clear that all the answers weren't out there. I believe that at the time the commissioner even said to the field that she chose to move forward in the absence of knowing all of the formulas and prices and processes and all of that." A central office manager was present at a meeting of managers where the commissioner likened the changes they were making to "all of us jumping off a cliff together" and not knowing how they were to survive. This sent the message throughout the organization that there was what a construction manager called a "kind of amorphousness about what we were doing" that leadership expected staff to address.
Actors interpreted the commissioner's rhetoric, which was reinforced by their knowledge that they had little expertise about the problem, as both pressure and permission from the organization to improvise a response. Their subsequent actions echoed some of the steps to organizational improvisation suggested by Barrett (1998) . First, actors interrupted "habit patterns" (Barrett 1998, 607) by focusing not on the old ways of the models but on what was an underspecified but powerful new idea, individualization. As one field manager recalled, "When individualization hit, nobody really understood it." Another reported a sense that individualization was an undefined "something [that] was out there" that the organization had to incorporate. Actors accepted that their usual ways of doing things were shifting, and they understood they had to act. As a result, they focused on the idea of individualization even before they understood what it meant.
Next, they expressed comfort with not having all the answers, anticipating "errors as a source of learning" (Barrett 1998, 610) . A construction manager knew at the time that individualization "wasn't the oldway of doing business ... it was clear that all the answers weren't out there ..." Actors anticipated that they would be able to take action despite few rules about how they were going to achieve goals. They worked through the uncertainty by talking with each other, as one manager recounts, about how they "hadn't decided how we're going to do the houses." He recalled that they "went though six or eight months of this indecisiveness." Actors used the absence of routine and their inability to successfully bracket a solution to the problem as an opportunity to seek more information and create new rules. Their acceptance of these conditions suggests that they understood that while the context was pressing them to change, it was also giving them permission and time to experiment.
Thus freed from the past ways of doing things actors became receptive to others' ideas about how to proceed. They reacted to this permissive context of "minimal structures" and "maximum flexibility" with creativity (Barrett 1998, 611) . They resolved uncertainty, not by acquiescing to stage fright, but by communal performance. A field manager recalls anticipating that "we would all kind of go through it together." A construction manager expressed comfort that "the new approach was better because it was definitely focused on the goal" of individualization. Organizational actors used their repertoire of skills and experience to move beyond keyed enactment to an ingeniously improvised enactment of community homes. Improvisation Techniques. Improvisational performances require a reframing of melody so that what follows makes musical sense. In this organization, improvisational sense making involved a reframing of the past and a framing of the new individualized context. The DDD began with a campaign to rationalize retroactively to constituencies statewide that the new approach was a logical extension of all that had come before. Next, the DDD created a new definition of community living through a new language of disability. They declared a moratorium on new construction and moved construction oversight away from the CDC to the field program staffs. This shifted the oversight of community homes from construction experts to treatment experts.
Technique #1: Referring back. Like jazz musicians who start a song with an old, familiar melody, improvising actors use the past to make sense of the present. The DDD periodically issued a five year report, a voluminous document that recounted the organization's history, plans, and accomplishments of the past few years. Widely circulated among organizational constituents, the report was also often cited in budget documents and executive speeches. It provided the preferred rhetoric DDD staff was expected to use as they attempted to implement new program directives. It was a public document used to convey carefully calculated representations of agency actions.
In the report issued during this period, the history of the model community homes was relegated to the organization's product development phase. It discounted the models as mere rehearsal to the actual community home program. The report declared that although the model approach had been a useful venture it could not be sustained fiscally into the future, and it was not, in any case, in the best interest of an individualized approach to the developmentally disabled. The DDD proclaimed in the report that they were embracing a new era where needs and costs would be matched to individualized services and which would, incidentally, be in keeping with new federal and state emphasis on efficiency.
Technique #2: A new vocabulary signals a new direction.
Along with the retrospective rationalizations that the organization put forward, it developed a new language for discussing the new approach. The phrase mentally retarded vias everywhere replaced by developmentally disabled, and individual replaced the word client in all documents. The DDD began to use terms like individualized service environment and individualized residential alternative instead of community home, as did some of the new federal regulations. Documents reflected these changes with references now to the population we serve or residents, and the disabled. In the new vocabulary, the term model home came to mean the antithesis of community home. The model manual and all it represented became obsolete artifacts of the old community living program.
Technique #3: New players with different skills are brought together. The growing criticism of the model homes grew into criticism of the CDC unit. The DDD executive staff used the new budget to announce that community home planning would no longer involve new construction. They assigned program staff in the field to acquire and rehabilitate existing homes with the help of local construction consultants whose services they could purchase as needed. Still embedded in the construction institutions of the preindividualization days, the CDC unit lost influence as the DDD redefined community development. Their new role in the organization was less exclusive, less powerful than under the model home regime.
At the end of this improvisational theme, the entrepreneurial ground had shifted from a professional and coherent CDC ensemble to a diffuse band of program staff. This new band was interested in playing new tunes and was unfettered by old arrangements. Program staff was scattered across the state, reporting through various bureaucratic structures. Program staff that previously had responsibility for treatment assumed the role of general contractors. Unlike the CDC staff, which used professional standards to evaluate construction needs, program staff used idiosyncratic rules and improvised new practices as they faced new problems. The houses that they acquired for the organization were varied in size, style, and accommodation. They were not as safe and secure as the model homes, but in most cases they were reasonably so. As the size of the homes decreased, their styling became simpler, and they were required to meet fewer building and fire codes.
Third Theme: The Campus Reprise
Beginning in 1995, executive staff directed CDC construction staff to retrofit portions of existing campuses so that they could be reused to house developmentally disabled individuals who were at risk of, or were actually causing in their communities what the staff labeled as behavioral problems. This brought together the program and the CDC staff to work as partners in the redesign of campuses into community-like secure residences. Their forced alliance signaled organizational recognition of each unit's capacities and limitations and gave neither authority over the other.
Context: Unanticipated Individualized Behaviors. In musical performance, reprised songs remind the audience of the central theme and of the place of the theme in the story. The essence of reprise is a "falling back on older ideas" (Weick 1998, 553) . In the same way, enacting reprise change strategies in organizations involves actors' reassessment of past changes and categorizing them within the assortment of other organizational practices for their endogenous and exogenous audiences.
The reprise theme at DDD involved a reuse of the campuses as residences. It was driven in part by the experience of community living and, ironically, the success of the community resettlement efforts. Advocacy for the developmentally disabled to live "just like everybody else" included an unexpected sharing in the dysfunctions of the population at large. In reprising change, organizational actors refocused on the community program from the perspective of the community home neighbors and of the minority among the disabled, those behavioral disabled who might fail in their community placement.
The term behavioral was DDD terminology for developmentally disabled individuals who exhibited difficult-to-control, disturbing behavior. It stood for behaviorally maladaptive. One central office manager defined a behavioral act in the following way: "If you do it in the institution, it's not criminal. If you do it in the community, it's criminal.... They were stealing, they were assaulting people, they were having sex when they shouldn't, indiscriminately with other kinds of people. They were basically committing acts that if you committed them on the public would certainly get you arrested."
As more individuals moved into community based homes, there was a sense in the organization that some of this activity could put at risk the rest of the community program. The risk came from those disabled for whom ordinary neighborhoods offered so much freedom that they might hurt themselves and others. Concern with these risks was intensified when a mentally ill patient escaped from state custody and pushed someone under a train. That agency's chief officer was dismissed, and the administration's attempts to assign blame caught the organization's attention.
One central office manager's observations on behavioral individuals who were living in the community illustrates reprise sense making:
They were, to a certain extent, threatening the mainstream mission of the DDD. Because as we downsized institutions and went towards closure and talked about a totally community based system there was a core group of people that clearly didn't fit that mode. In people's heart of hearts, no matter how committed they were, if you had a guy who was sexually threatening to children, you really couldn't talk about that guy living right on Main StreeL And so we had to return to the campuses.... We couldn't continue doing what we were doing.
Sense Making: Reflecting on the Community. After most of the campus residents had been placed in the community, the organization ordered the examination of prior placements into community homes to identify whether there were any individuals who were at risk in the community. One field manager commented that thinking about the disabled has changed: "There are people who, depending on their behavior, should not be in community settings until we treat that behavior."
Rather than negate the idea that the developmentally disabled were individuals, this thinking further integrated them into the rest of the population. A central office manager expressed it this way: "Never mind that he's got a philosophical right to live in the community because he's mentally retarded, we're going to hold him to the same standard we would anybody else." Those who were judged unable to live in community homes because they did not meet that standard were to be returned to the campuses. This was because, as the central office manager observed, "one of the characteristics of the campuses and one of the functions of the campuses was to take those behaviors out of society." These were the voices of restraint. They expressed an entrepreneurial concern, not for improvisation, but for the survival and future well being of the organization.
Techniques Associated with Reprise. The concept of reprise encompasses the coherent integration of new, improved routines and practices with older amended ones. Older practices may be brought back to reassert an earlier mission that still has legitimacy or simply to provide legitimacy. Actors have attempted to contain the excesses of the community program and have reintroduced the use of the campuses through modifications of past construction and program practices. Earlier in its history, the organization's actors had keyed model homes on the campuses into community homes. This reprise of the campuses as secure facilities reflects their earlier identity but amends it by ensuring that individualization and a community-like feeling is incorporated into the campus renovations. Specifically, in this theme the campuses have been redeemed and reused as secure homes.
Actors have used two techniques to enact this interpretation. One has been to reassure themselves of campus safety and security by involving the CDC. The second has been to have the CDC work in partnership with program staff to create a secure perimeter around portions of the campuses. This has incorporated the use of naturally occurring tension between the keyers and the improvisers to limit the excesses of campus as well as those of community routines.
Technique #1: Recomissioning the keyers. Throughout the period of the acquisition and rehabilitation of homes, CDC unit staff became increasingly involved in redeeming the poor choices that the field sometimes had made in acquiring and renovating existing housing for use in the community program. The CDC unit had been rebuilding its reputation for expertise in construction regulations and practices. Believing that outside consultants could not be trusted to do a job efficiently and on time, the DDD directed the CDC unit to design and construct the secure units that were to be situated on state campuses. One architect puzzled at the suddenness and the circumstances with which they were assigned the campus jobs:
Basically, they told us that they had this mission that was given to them from the governor's office and that we had to take care of this security fence. It had to be done in a certain amount of time ... And all the tasks were not always discovered until we actually got into it... we didn't think we would have problems since this was a special funded project, but it didn't go that way, because of the bidding problems. I don't know why the administration gave it to us.
The secure unit assignment echoed the circumstances that preceded the model home CDC assignment, and for good reason. To DDD administrators the CDC unit meant control, strength, and unequivocal commitment to detail. The evidence for this was in the model homes whose construction they had overseen. The organization sought to transform the campuses into secure, community-like residences by having the CDC reprise its old role.
Technique U2: Keyers and improvisers become partners. Program and CDC staff had traditionally worked independently of one another. The contrasting qualities of the models and the rehabilitated community homes reflected this segregation. Mindful of the extremes of both approaches, executive direction on the secure unit projects assigned joint responsibility for the secure units to CDC and program staff. This reasserted CDC's role as DDD construction experts, but it created a new role for program staff as quality controllers. One architect recalled program staff "giving us input into the program... the type of people in there, things to watch out for, the cautions in the design." The secure unit projects meshed past practices with new in an attempt to introduce a community home sensibility to the campuses yet avoid the poor design and construction practices of the rehabilitated houses.
This arrangement led to tension between the two groups. This friction emerged as a control routine over the secure projects and allowed each group to enact its view of the secure units. Program staff controlled the program aspects of the project by specifying, for example, "the type of locks and the electrification and the heights and the anchoring of the fence" that were to surround the secure units. CDC staff understood that program might "know the requirements but technically not know how to put it together." In this way, the DDD attempted to create a self-managing partnership to avoid 545/J-PART, October 2002
Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change
the mistakes of the model homes as well as those of the renovated homes.
DISCUSSION
Institutional Entrepreneurs: Challengers and Incumbents and Integrators
In this study we have linked bureaucratic entrepreneurship to the contextual factors that shape change. Actors in our study enacted problem solutions in response to environmental pressure by using their skill, capacity, and ability to control resources (Fligstein 1997) . In keying change, the actors who were integral to framing the problem were the incumbent entrepreneurs (Fligstein 1997, 401) . They enacted a strategy that reflected the routines of their professional and organizational contexts and reinforced their positions in the organization. These incumbent entrepreneurs used local conditions, the nature of the problem, and their ownership of current arrangements to defend their positions. Following Schumpeter's definition (1991), they did new things in old ways. The improvisation theme explored the strategic action of challenger entrepreneurs (Fligstein 1997, 401) . Challengers enact and reflect a more complex and differentiated environment. The challengers were vigilant about opportunities to advance their views and were comfortable with advocating ambiguous, untried approaches. In the reprise theme, the organization preemptively adjusted organizational order to avoid either a full return to past routines or an abandonment of new routines. These integrative entrepreneurs opted for risk reduction and stability based on changed signals from the environment.
A Model of Institutional Change
From our analysis of these data we derived three constants that affect institutional change: actors enact change through sense making; environmental pressures change over time; and environments affect actors' attachment to institutionalized routines. Our data suggest that these elements combine differently in keyed, improvised, and reprised change.
In keyed change, the model indicates that actors are fully embedded in their organizational contexts. They employ bracketing as a sense-making strategy to fit problems into a context that is coherent and stable. In bracketing information, actors do not observe internal or external conflict about how to solve the change problem nor do they find a contest over resources. They frame the change problem as a version of familiar routines. In enacting improvisation, organizational entrepreneurs also bracket environmental information but find incomplete or fragmented data. Actors go beyond bracketing to consider the conflicting or competing messages that are received from environmental and internal sources. Using this information, they frame those problems that most threaten organizational legitimacy or resources (Powell 1988) . In interpreting substantive threats to organizational legitimacy as a crisis, actors experience a sense of urgency about solving the problem. When they sense that environmental pressure is substantial enough to signal that a crisis is developing, they take that as permission to challenge existing arrangements. They then use creative bracketing, action, and reflection in an iterative trial and error process to construct creative solutions.
Acting as organizational boundary spanners, integrative entrepreneurs enact reprised change strategies. These actors watch the environment and listen to policy overseers, resource controllers, and societal news. They consider past organizational practices and the details of prior action, keyed or improvised. Reprise entrepreneurialism affords keyers, incumbents, and others a chance to rethink changes and to ensure that the organization has correctly interpreted past environmental pressures.
In our model we attempt to convey the idea that enactment strategies are shaped both by actors and by the environment. We argue that the nature of the problem faced, the environmental pressure to address it, and the position of actors affects the enactment strategy actors will employ. We suggest that actors take on different roles depending on the state of the organization, the nature of the problem, the context surrounding pressure to change, and their capacity to act. Our organizational actors do not yield to sets of determinant environmental forces or react helplessly to their whims. They are cognitively alert entrepreneurs who match their strategic actions to contextual signals, changing routines when it makes sense to do so and retaining them when it does not.
Actors' interpretations of events can suggest actions that they may begin, but may later abandon or alter (Weick 1995) . Elements of each of these enactment streams are present in each thematic story we present. Our themes suggest the likely, though not the necessary, reaction to certain combinations of context, sense making, and techniques. Other public organizations with different core technologies may reveal a different balance of keying, improvisation, and reprise strategies. Our model of institutional change suggests that context, strategies, and outcomes affect and are affected by type of change. Most importantly, for public organizations this implies that the magnitude of risk attached to the change will affect how actors will respond to the pressure to change. Future research into institutional change should reflect that higher risk situations would collapse the time it takes for sense-making strategies to emerge. It is not our intention to provide a complete model of institutional change, but rather to focus on sense making and action phases where entrepreneur and change advocates take the first step. We suggest that this approach be used to explore further institutional change as a sense-making process.
Sense Making and Entrepreneurialsm in Public Organizations
Our approach to studying entrepreneurialism and organizational change contrasts with the normatively oriented explorations of managerial action and organizational change in the public administration literature. This literature identifies prescriptions for entrepreneurial behavior that focus on leadership (Behn 1991) , capacity (Williams 1980) , core values (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Light 1998) , or on accountability and due process (Romzek and Ingraham 1994) . The normative perspective on entrepreneurs in public organizations is that they can control and plan change that is primarily understood to be episodic (Weick and Quinn 1999) . This approach assumes that there exist best managerial strategies that can push organizational actors in the direction of new behaviors (Weick and Quinn 1999) .
The themes explored in this article are analogous to Kingdon's (1984) concept that policy action can develop along three routes: from nominal action that leads to fading interest in policy issues, from focusing events that channel crises into novel solutions, and from implementation feedback that modifies prior policy responses (pp. 99-110) . Keying explains how DDD was able to portray itself as having solved the community home problem when it had merely replicated the campus settings, thus making the consent decree and its policies fade in visibility. Improvisation explains how the idea of individualization served as a focus of attention for the diverse constituencies that populated DDD's environment and how that focus instigated a crisis that redefined the community home policy. Reprise illustrates how feedback about community policies led to a review of past practices and the reuse of campuses. This analogy between sense-making theory and policy development links policy to practice and entrepreneurial action to institutional change.
Our approach to entrepreneurialism in organizations is analytic in that it assumes that institutional change is created out of a sensemaking process that is itself changeable. It sees change as a continuous process that involves ongoing interpretation and enactment by sense makers whose actions both shape and are shaped by environmental and organizational contexts (Weick and Quinn 1999) . It assumes that even substantial pressure rarely triggers immediate revolutionary changes in behaviors, in contrast to punctuated equilibrium theories of change (Gersick 1991) . It envisions actors who, despite intense pressures to change, are embedded in organizational contexts of taken-for-granted routines and practices. Our emphasis is on understanding how public entrepreneurs make sense of this context and interpret its cues, rather than on how they can control the behavior of others. In this perspective the debate on the nature of public entrepreneurs shifts from prescribing how they can make change happen to understanding entrepreneurs as enactors and sense makers of an ongoing change process.
We argue that opportunities for entrepreneurship will be grasped by sense makers at all organizational levels whenever contextual signals penetrate their interests. If institutional change is a continuous process, then interventions into that process must go beyond the episodic, bureaucratic memo or policy declaration of change from the top. Would-be change entrepreneurs need to empower their followers to make sense of their changing context (Weick and Quinn 1999; Sandfort 2000) . This would involve the purposive use of language and symbols to signal permission and expectations for new behaviors (Barzelay 1992; Weick and Quinn 1999; Sandfort 2000) , as in the improvising of normal community homes at DDD.
CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurship in public organizations can be viewed as potentially permeating all organizational levels, reflecting change as a continuous and sense-making process. We propose that this analytic approach may be what is general izable from our study, rather than the details of sense making in one state agency over a long period. We argue that exploring the sense-making strategies of organizational actors is key to understanding their entrepreneurial behavior. We suspect that these strategies will evolve more quickly when the pressure to change is understood as more substantial. Environments that are intensely and rapidly changing may provide rich research opportunities. The themes explored in this article argue that the process of institutional change should be added to the debate about entrepreneurship in public administration. While this will complicate the debate, from our findings we conclude that entrepreneurs act to change institutionalized routines and practices within the bounds of their sense making and of their environment. The focus of attention in public administration needs to include not just the disposition of organizational actors, but also their constraints, capacities, opportunities, and social networks.
